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TERMINATION OF THE COMMUNITY

Introduction
Termination of the community of acquets and gains' in Louisiana
gives rise to a series of complex issues, some of which have not been
fully responded to in the latest matrimonial regimes revisions.2 Only
one Civil Code article' addresses the matter of satisfaction of predissolution debts upon termination of the community, as between a
spouse and third person creditors. Several articles' define the rights
of reimbursement between spouses at termination, but the legislation is inadequate in terms of relating the articles on judicial partition5 to termination of the regime. Some improvements in Louisiana
matrimonial regimes laws have been made. Nevertheless, some old
problems still exist; other problems are raised by the new legislation itself. This fact has been recognized by the legislature in the
form of a resolution establishing a joint committee "to study the
need for and feasibility of developing a specific procedure for the
partition of community property between spouses, and settlement of
debts and claims for reimbursement upon dissolution of the community
for any cause."' Hopefully, some suggestions herein discussed will
be considered as the legislature seeks to improve the law regarding
termination of the community.
Satisfaction of Pre-Dissolution Obligations
Civil Code article 2357 allows, upon termination, a separate' or
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2356 provides: "Thc legal regime of community property
terminates by the death of a spouse or by a judgment of divorce, separation from bed

and board, or separation of property." For further discussion of article 2356, see Spaht
& Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978

Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REv. 83, 123-24 (19791.
2. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1.
3. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2357.
4. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2358. 2364-2368.
5. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1289.1414.

6. La. S.R. Con. Res. No. 165, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
7. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2363 defines separate obligations:

A separate obligation of a spouse is one incurred by that spouse prior to the
establishment or after termination of a community property regime, or one incurred during the existence of a community property regime though not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse. An obligation
resulting from an intentional wrong not perpetrated for the benefit of the community, or an obligation incurred for the separate property of a spouse to the ex-

tent that it does not benefit the community, the family, or the other spouse, is
likewise a separate obligation.
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community 8 obligation incurred prior to dissolution' to be satisfied
8. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2360 defines community obligations: "An obligation incur.
red by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common
interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation."
9. Judgments of divorce, separation from bed and board, and separation of property operate retroactively to the date of filing. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 155, 159, 2375. An
issue arises as to whether persons who become creditors after filing of the petition but
before judgment can be considered "pre-dissolution creditors" for the purpose of applying article 2357. Articles 155, 159, and 2375 all state that the judgment's retroactive ef.
fects are to be without prejudice "to rights validly acquired in the interim." The prob.
lem centers around what rights are "rights validly acquired."
Support may be found in the jurisprudence for the position that a creditor whose
transaction with a spouse occurs after filing of a suit which will terminate the community should have his recovery limited to the incurring spouse's separate property.
In Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244 La.
901, 154 So. 2d 769 (1963), the court utilized the prohibition in Civil Code article 150 to
rule that an obligation incurred by a husband after filing a suit for separation from bed
and board is his separate debt even without the filing of lis pendens. See LA. Civ.
CODE art. 150 (repealed 1979). Two years earlier, however, in Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So.
2d 97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), a different court had ruled that a third party purchaser
of an immovable is protected by the public records doctrine and that lis pendens had
to be filed before a wife could take advantage of the article 150 limitation upon the
husband's ability to dispose of immovables.
Article 155 did not provide for a retroactive effect nor the accompanying protec.
tion of "rights validly acquired" until a year after Shapiro. 1962 La. Acts, No. 178, § 1.
That provision was effective at the time of the Landreneau decision, although the
court did not refer to it. That silence is understandable in that the Landreneau
creditor clearly did not have a "right validly acquired" under article 155; article 150
expressly prohibited the transaction from binding the community. Of course, the
creditor in Landreneau did have a right to seize the property of his debtor, LA. CIv.
CODE art. 3183, and retroactive dissolution had to be without prejudice to that right.
The recent repeal of article 150 arguably could signal an intent to allow a Landreneau creditor to claim a "right validly acquired" under article 155 and therefore
avail himself of article 2357. However, it is submitted that the legislative intent was
not to grant a creditor more rights under article 155, but to equalize the position of
the spouses by rejecting the discriminatory provisions of article 150. Article 155 was
amended at the same time article 150 was repealed; however, that amendment simply
substituted gender-neutral terms. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 1. The fact that no other
significant changes were made in the language of article 155 indicates that there was
no legislative intent to grant more rights than were previously recognized. Therefore,
article 2357 apparently will not generally be applicable to those who became creditors
after the filing of a petition for separation, divorce, or separation of property.
Nevertheless, in a case like Shapiro-involving a third party purchaser of an immovable-the lis pendens statutes, LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3751-3753, may be imposed
upon article 155 in order to protect the third party in the same manner Shapiro did.
However, since alienation of an immovable now generally requires consent of both
spouses, LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347, facts identical to Shapiro probably would arise infrequently, for example, 1) when a spouse has renounced the right to concur, LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2348, or 2) when a matrimonial agreement has given one spouse the exclusive power to alienate community immovables. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2329. This
peculiar situation deserves more legislative attention.
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from the property of the former community'" as well as from the
separate property" of the spouse who incurred the debt. Article
2345, which concerns satisfaction of obligations during the existence
of the community, is substantially the same as the first paragraph of
article 2357.2 Consideration of article 2345 and the jurisprudence

leading
to its enactment may help to justify the provisions of article
3
2357.'

Before the latest revisions, an antenuptial creditor of the husband, during the existence of the community, could satisfy the
obligation from community property." The antenuptial creditor of
the wife did not have similar access to the property of the community,'"
other than to the wife's earnings during the marriage." Whether
this disparate treatment was a derogation from the express provisions of the Civil Code,' 7 or whether satisfaction from community
property by the husband's antenuptial creditor was actually in strict
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338 defines community property:
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of
the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property
acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless
classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the
spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded
for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property
not classified by law as separate property.

10.

11.

LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341 defines separate property:

The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property acquired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime;
property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and community things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in comparison with the value of the separate things used; property acquired by a spouse
by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in an
action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as
a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community property by the
other spouse; and damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection
with the management of his separate property.
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2345 provides: "A separate or community obligation may be
satisfied during the community property regime from community property and from
the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
13. The policy of article 2357 which allows the antenuptial creditor of one spouse
to recover, upon termination, from the property of the former community in the hands
of the non-incurring spouse has been criticized as "a valiant attempt" to protect
creditors which "goes too far." Riley, Analysis of the 1980 Revision of the Matimonial
Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453, 512 (1980).
14. See Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
15. Id.
16. LA. R.S. 9:3584 (Supp. 1975) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 3).
17. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2403 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1) provided, in pertinent part: "[Tlhe debts of both husband and wife,
anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own personal and individual
effects."
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adherence to' the Code has been the subject of some dispu te.'8
Nevertheless, the reasoning apparently was based on the notion
that since the husband, as head and master of the community,' had
the right to administer and alienate (including the dation en paiement)
community effects without consent of the wife, his separate
creditors should be able to execute against the community." The
assets of the community were considered part of the husband's
patrimony, not the wife's.' Since the property of the debtor is the
common pledge of his creditors," the reasoning was clearly tenable.
Upon first glance at the present matrimonial regimes articles,
one might think that the same reasoning supports the policy of article
2345 and, ultimately, of article 2357. Since Louisiana now has equal
management of community property, 23 the separate creditors (including antenuptial creditors) of either spouse should be able to
satisfy debts from community property. However, equal management does not apply to all community property. 2' The legislative expansion of sources from which creditors may recover must be based
on reasoning other than simply correlating the power to manage and
alienate with an exposure to liability. Rather, articles 2345 and 2357
appear to reflect a legislative policy geared toward extending to the
wife and her creditors the same rights previously enjoyed by the
husband and his creditors. The community is no longer considered
part of the husband's patrimony exclusively. "5 Being part of the
18. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 1). For further discussion of this dispute, see Note, Community of Acqueta and Gains-Antenuptial Obligations of the Husband-Article 2403, 29 LA. L.
REV. 409 (1969).

19. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 1).
20. See Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 523. 76 So. 2d 713, 717 (1954) (quoting
Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396, 396 (1858): "As the husband has the right to
alienate the effects of the community without the consent of his wife, creditors of the
husband before marriage ought also to have the right to seize the effects of the cornmunity to satisfy their claims."). This language was again quoted approvingly in
Creech v. Capital Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d at 502, which overruled United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968), a case which had
discredited the reasoning. For a full discussion of the rights of creditors under the old
provisions, see Comment, Creditors Rights, 25 LA. L. REv. 201 (1964).
21. See Pascal, Louisiana's 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53 TUL. L.
REV. 105, 108 (1978).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3183.
23. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2346. For a full discussion of the management provisions,
see Note, Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal Movables. 42 LA. L. REv.
770 (1981), this issue.
24. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2350-2352 and the comments thereto. See also Note,
aupra note 23.
25. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336, comment (c) states, in part, "An undivided one-half of
this mass forms a part of the patrimony of each spouse
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patrimony of both spouses, the community funds logically are available for satisfaction of the debts of either spouse, whether those
debts are separate or community."
Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc. 7 and other jurisprudence allowing
the husband's separate creditors to recover against community property involved satisfaction of obligations during the existence of the
community."5 Upon termination, the husband's separate creditors
could recover only from the husband's interest in the community,
and then only after partition and payment of community creditors.'
Thus, article 2357, dealing with satisfaction of obligations after termination of the regime, cannot be interpreted as an extension of
rights to the wife which the husband alone previously enjoyed. The
probable intent of the legislature was simply to make certain that
termination of the community would have no adverse effect on predissolution creditors, at least as to assets already acquired by the
community prior to the moment of termination." The first paragraph of article 2357 gives to the pre-dissolution creditor no more
and no fewer rights after termination than he held during the existence of the community."1
Article 2357 reflects a creditor-oriented scheme, an orientation
which pervades the entire scope of the revisions." Evidence of the
concern for creditors' rights is found in the second paragraph of article
2357, under which a spouse who disposes of property of the former
26. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3182 & 3183.
27. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
28. See Riley, supra note 13, at 507 n.271, 511.
29. See, e.g., Markham v. Allen, 22 La. Ann. 513 (1870); Comment, supra note 20,
at 232-33. See also Comment, The Fictitious Community and the Right to Partition,30
LA. L. REV. 603(1970).
30. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1. at 125.
31. Termination of the community will have an effect on pre-dissolution creditors
in terms of future assets available for satisfaction of the debt. For example, the salary
of the non-incurring spouse will no longer go into a community fund and will therefore
become insulated from the reach of those who became creditors by virtue of transactions with the other spouse. See Bilbe, "Management" of Community Assets under
Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV. 409, 429 (1979); Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 124-25. Contrast this result with a recent amendment to article 2336 which allows a voluntary nonjudicial partition during the community existence. 1981 La. Acts, No. 921. § 1. amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336. The effect of a partition during the community existence
will be a reclassification of presently owned property at a time earlier than termination. Upon termination of a community whose members had previously entered into a
voluntary partition, the provisions of article 2357 still will be applicable. However, little
or no "property of the former community" may remain from which a pre-dissolution
creditor might recover.
32. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2330, 2345, 2364 & 2365. See generally Bartke, The
Reform of the Community Property System of Louisiana-A Response to its Critics,
54 TUL. L. REV. 294, 333-34 (1980); Bilbe, supra note 31; Pascal, supra note 21; Riley,
supra note 13; Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1.
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community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of a community
obligation becomes liable for all obligations incurred by the other
spouse up to the value of the disposed property." Some theoretical
basis exists upon which to conclude that this provision is not unfair
to the disposing spouse. Because article 2357 makes all assets of the
former community available for execution by all pre-dissolution
creditors of either spouse, the non-debtor spouse injures the position
of any pre-dissolution creditor by disposing of the property of the
former community. As the articles are concerned generally with protection of creditors,' a provision which effectively freezes a
creditor's position with regard to the assets, or at least the value of
the former community, is conceptually not a problem.
Nevertheless, article 2357, which indiscriminately exposes a
spouse to liability for disposing of assets of the former community,
creates problems which realistically are difficult to dismiss. Other
authors have questioned whether the disposition of property of the
former community in order to meet "current living expenses" trig..
gers the personal liability of paragraph two." Perhaps the legis.
lature should provide an additional exception to personal liability
where a spouse disposes of former community assets for the satis..
faction of community obligations or for the purpose of providing for
current living expenses. However, the choice of statutory language
must be made carefully, as that choice may have a significant effect,
on how satisfactorily the issue can be resolved.
The problem is not difficult to imagine. For example, after termination, W, perhaps a previously non-working spouse, finds herself
working at low wages to pay apartment rent and buy groceries. In
order to make ends meet, she decides to sell the car which she has
by virtue of a voluntary partition of the former community. Under
current law, she apparently would be liable for all (separate and
33. The second paragraph of article 2357 provides: "If a spouse disposes of property
of the former community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community
obligations, he is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value
of that community property."
A simple hypothetical illustrates the effect of this.provision: H and W have terminated their community. H owes creditor A $500 for an antenuptial debt. A may not
ordinarily satisfy this debt from the separate property of W, e.g., wages she has earned
since termination. However, if W disposes of any property of the former community
for a purpose other than for the satisfaction of a community obligation, paragraph two
of article 2357 is triggered, and W's separate property becomes available for the
satisfaction of H's antenuptial debt up to the value of the property disposed of by W.
W's wages may then be garnished by A to satisfy the obligation.

34. See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
35. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 126.
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community) pre-dissolution obligations" incurred by H up to the
value of the car. This result clearly defeats the purpose for which
she sold it, i.e., to have money on which to live.
A formula should be devised whereby the welfare of such a
spouse could be preserved without serious consequences for the
creditors. A term stronger than "current living expenses"-for example, "necessities"37 or "necessaries""- would provide more certainty as to when the spouse could safely dispose of property of the
former community. A broad phrase may be construed to mean that
virtually any purpose" would shield W from incurring the liability,
thereby injuring the creditors' position. On the other hand, as shown
by jurisprudential interpretation of narrowly drawn codal provi-

sions," a more restricted phrase may put W back in the position she
apparently is in now: unable to dispose of the property of the former
community for any purpose without incurring personal liability.
Policy reasons may cause a strong term such as "necessaries" to be
construed even more strictly than it has been in jurisprudential
treatment of other code articles. For example, the policy previously
underlying the ability of the wife to bind the community for

necessaries, erroneously derived from article 1786," differs from that
underlying article 2357 in that the former is more concerned with
the welfare of the person requiring the "necessaries." On the other
hand, the primary concern of article 2357 is assuring the payment of

36. A literal construction of the provision leads to a suggestion that the liability
might extend to H's post-dissolution obligations as well. See text at notes 43-46, infra.
37. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 229 (alimentary duties of ascendants and descendants
are "limited to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and health care . . .").
38. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1786 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 2) (a husband's authorization of contracts of wife is presumed where
the contracts are "for necessaries for herself and family, where he does not provide...").
39. One argument is that "meeting current living expenses" will always be the
purpose of W's selling the car in the first place. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at
126.
40. See Thibodaux v. Richard, 60 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952); Johnston v.
Pike, 14 La. Ann. 731, 732 (1859) (.emphasizing that the wife's right under article 1786
is "extremely limited"). See also Russell v. Culpepper, 344 So. 2d 1372, 1379 (La. 1977)
(the obligation of a child to support his parent under article 229 exists only if the
parent is "needy").
41. The use of article 1786 in the jurisprudence to permit the wife to bind the
community has been strongly criticized as a "misapplication" of that provision. R.
PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE § 5.4 (1979). Professor Pascal has suggested
that article 1786 merely treated the married woman's capacity to obligate herself, and
that the appropriate method by which the wife could bind her husband would be as his
negotiorum geetor. Id.; Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 34 LA. L. REV. 255, 258 (1974).
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pre-dissolution creditors. Therefore, a tendency might develop to
construe narrowly opportunities for a spouse to escape the additional liability.
A legislative provision that could adequately safeguard the interests of creditors, while at the same time providing the kind of
freedom from additional liability for the non-incurring spouse that
such an amendment would seek to accomplish, is as difficult to
perceive as it is necessary. Regardless of any changes made by the
legislation, the jurisprudence which develops will need to determine
just how far a spouse may go in providing for herself after termination without incurring liability for all obligations incurred by the
other spouse.
Whenever a situation arises in which a spouse has disposed of
property of the former community, the creditor may have problems
tracing the funds which have been received for that property. If W
sells the car, a determination must be made whether the car was in
fact "property of the former community." In addition, if an amend..
ment is enacted which excludes funds so obtained from exposing a
spouse to liability when they are used for "current living expenses"
or for "necessaries," a finding will have to be made to determine the
amount of funds used for that purpose. Tracing the funds may prove
to be a difficult burden for the creditor. The disposing spouse will
be the only one who actually knows which property belonged to the
former community and how much of the funds were used for "current living expenses" or "necessaries." Nevertheless, the burden of
proof will be on the plaintiff creditor. Placing this heavy burden on
the creditor may militate against inserting aft exception to incurring
liability for "current living expenses" or "necessaries." Since the
general philosophy of article 2357 favors satisfaction of debts, an
amendment which would diminish a creditor's opportunity to
recover may not be desirable.
If W has incurred the liability under article 2357 by selling the
car, the degree to which she becomes responsible may prove particularly harsh. The article calls for liability up to the value of the
community property, which may or may not be equivalent to the
amount of money W received for the car. In the given hypothetical,
W's bargaining position will be understandably weak, as she is in
need of money immediately. Being in no position to hold out for a
higher price, W may settle for a price somewhat below the actual
value of the car. The result, if the express provisions of article 2357
are to be followed, would be liability up to the actual value of the
car. The formula for liability under the second paragraph thus
should be changed to "up to the just value received for such com-
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munity property." The term "just" is critical, as it will help prevent
opening the door to fraudulent dispositions. 2
Another potential problem with the second paragraph could be
avoided by simple amendment. The phrase "all obligations incurred
by the other spouse" is not followed by a time reference. The
precise wording of the paragraph would seem to mean that if W
sells the car for any reason other than for satisfaction of a community
obligation, she becomes liable even to post-dissolution creditors of
H, up to the value of the car. No rational basis exists for such a
result. As to post-dissolution creditors-:by virtue of the partition-the car is simply part of W's separate property. Consideration
of the first paragraph of the article gives support to the position
that the legislature did not intend for post-dissolution creditors to
take advantage of the non-incurring spouse's disposition of property
of the former community. Only those obligations incurred "before or
during the community property regime" may be satisfied out of the
property of the former community under the first paragraph. 3 The
first paragraph is significant for the statutory construction of the
second; by the express terms of the first paragraph, a postdissolution creditor of H could not execute against the car before W
sold it. A creditor now should not be allowed to make a claim based
on her disposition of that car. He is not a creditor whose position
has been prejudiced by the sale." Although the first paragraph of
article 2357 apparently limits the article's application to certain
creditors, the second paragraph could be misread. Inserting the
phrase "before or during the community property regime" after "all
obligations incurred by the other spouse" in the second paragraph
42. If the non-incurring spouse were to try to injure intentionally the position of
the other spouse's creditors by disposing of the property of the former community at a
fraudulently low price, those creditors may not be able to bring a revocatory action,
LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1968-1994. That action permits a creditor to annul contracts of his

debtor which are made in fraud of the creditor's rights. The creditor who by virtue of
W's disposition is now able to recover from W's separate property has become W's
personal creditor only because of the disposition itself. Prior to that transaction, such a
creditor was merely a creditor as to the property of the former community. The

disposition creates a personal liability for W which previously did not exist. At the
time of the disposition the disposing spouse cannot be said to be defrauding "his
creditor," LA. Civ. CODE art. 1969, because that spouse is not the personal debtor of a
creditor who can recover only from property of the former community.

The unavailability of the revocatory action makes the inclusion of"just value received"
in the second paragraph of article 2357 even more desirable than if the creditor could
bring the action. Such an amendment would best serve the interests of affected
creditors while recognizing the reality of the disposing spouse's dilemma.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357.

44. See text at notes 33-34, supra.
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would be helpful. Such an amendment would do no more than clearly
state what was apparently the intent of those who enacted the article.
When a non-incurring spouse disposes of property of the former
community for a purpose other than for the satisfaction of a community obligation, he clearly subjects his separate property to execution by his former spouse's pre-dissolution creditors." However,
the final paragraph of article 2357 provides relief for a spouse who
wishes to protect his property (including the property of the former
community now in his possession) from the separate creditors of the
other spouse. The pertinent paragraph states: "A spouse may by
written act assume responsibility for one-half of each community
obligation incurred by the other spouse. In such case, the assuming
spouse may dispose of community property without incurring further responsibility for the obligations incurred by the other
spouse.""
While an in-depth discussion of the express assumption will not
be attempted here,'7 it is worth noting that the provision does not
allow the express assumption to affect community obligations incurred by the assuming spouse. The assuming spouse still will be liable
for the full amount of any community obligation he incurred,
whether such a debt is satisfied from his separate property or from
the property of the former community now in his possession. As to
the one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other
spouse, his separate property-previously not available under the
first paragraph of article 2357-is now available for execution.
The policy of permitting the separate creditor of one spouse to
seize assets of the community whether or not they are in the hands
of his debtor has raised at least one constitutional challenge. In
Williams v. First National Bank of Commerce," a federal district
court held that seizure under a writ of fieri facias of a wife's interest in her wages or other property in order to satisfy an obligation of the husband was a deprivation of property without due process. The finding of a due process violation was based on the fact
that the seizure was pursuant to "a judgment in an action in which:
(1) the wife was not a party; (b) was not served with the Citation and
Petition; and (c) the wife was not placed on notice, through allegations in the Petition and/or notation on the Citation, that the obliga45. See note 33, supra, and accompanying text.
46. For a full discussion of the express assumption of responsibility, see Spaht &
Samuel, supra note 1, at 126-33.
47. Id.
48. No. 79-3185 (E.D. La.. March 11, 1981).
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tion was a community obligation.""9 This decision could have farreaching effects on the ability of a creditor to seize property of the
former community"0 which is in the hands of a non-debtor spouse, a
substantive right which article 2357 clearly gives him.5"
Reimbursement
As previously stated, one underlying policy of article 2357 is to
protect the rights of creditors. 2 Article 2357 makes certain that
even if the creditor was not looking toward community assets at the
time of the transaction," community assets continue to remain available for the satisfaction of the debt. Despite the primary emphasis
49. Id., slip opinion at 1.
50. Although the opinion is brief and the facts of the dispute are not given, apparently the wife's community with her husband had not been terminated. Seemingly,
termination, if pertinent at all, only would have imposed an even stronger duty to put
the wife on notice.
51. Despite the Williams decision, too much concern for the survival of article
2357 may be undue. The court seems to take the position that a creditor may not obtain a judgment against a spouse if that judgment is to be satisfied from the property
of the other spouse, who was not given notice of the suit. The problem with the position is that it fails to make the basic distinction between procedural requirements for
obtaining a judgment in a lawsuit and procedural requirements for executing that
judgment. The real issue in a case like Williams is whether the judgment creditor can
seize and sell the property of the wife, not whether he should have been allowed to obtain the judgment itself. The Williams court is not clear in distinguishing these two
different questions, since it cites failure to give notice of the suit as the reason for
denying execution of the judgment.
Louisiana normally does not require notice of the institution of a suit in situations
somewhat analagous to Williams. For example, while the community properly may not
be considered as a "separate entity," it is similar to a partnership in that either spouse
generally can obligate community property without the other's consent. LA. Civ. CODE
art. 2346. When partnership obligations are sought to be enforced, it is not necessary
to make all-or any-partners party to a suit. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 737 & 1263.
Cf. LA. CODE CIv. P' art. 1235. Because one partner has the power to bind the partnership - just as one spouse has the power to bind community property - the rule seems fair.
On the other hand, notice to the wife of the seizure as provided in article 2293 of
the Code of Civil Procedure clearly should be required. At that point the wife could
present her claim as to why the disputed property is not subject to seizure (i.e., her
separate property) as a means of satisfying the judgment which the creditor is seeking
to execute. Cf. Bonner v. B-W Utilities, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. La. 1978) (mortgagor's transferee entitled to notice prior to judicial sale of the property). See generally
Buckner v. Carmack. 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092; LA. R.S.
13:3874. 4285 (1950).
While the prudent attorney would investigate what property could be used to
satisfy a judgment, should one be issued, whether certain property is subject to seizure
is not an issue in defending that suit for judgment. Nevertheless, the prudent approach is to join the spouse in the suit.
52. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 125.
53. See Riley, supra note 13, at 510.
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placed on protection of creditors' rights, the legislation shows some
concern for the spouses' ability to assert rights as between themselves. The reimbursement provisions," in most instances,55 lessen
the financial burden on a spouse who must pay debts for which he
should not be held solely responsible.
Upon first glance, the most noticeable difference in the new
reimbursement articles and the old article" is the prescribed
measure of reimbursement. Formerly, the Civil Code provided that
a spouse was entitled to one-half the enhanced value of the other
spouse's separate property, whenever that other spouse's separate
property had been increased due to "the common labor, expenses or

industry." 7 That same measure of reimbursement still is provided
for in only one situtation: where the separate property of one
spouse is increased "as a result of the uncompensated common labor
or industry of the spouses." 8 In four situations, the new articles provide that the measure of reimbursement is "one-half of the amount
or value"5 of the property used. This measure of reimbursement applies when a separate obligation has been satisfied with community
property," when a community obligation has been satisfied with
separate property,' when community property has been used for

54.

LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2358, 2364-2368.

55.

But see note 77, infra.

56.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 2408 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,

No. 709, § 1) provided:
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been increased
or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be
entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase or ameliorations, if
it be proved that the increase or ameliorations be the result of the common labor,
expenses or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of the
property, or to the chances of trade.
57. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2408 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1).
58. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2368 provides:
If the separate property of a spouse has increased in value as a result of the uncompensated common labor or industry of the spouses, the other spouse is entitled
to be reimbursed from the spouse whose property has increased in value one-half
of the increase attributed to the common labor.
59. (Emphasis added).
60.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 2364 provides:

If community property has been used to satisfy a separate obligation of a
spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement upon termination of the
community property regime for one-half of the amount or value that the property
had at the time it was used.
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2365 provides:
If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a community obligation, the spouse, upon termination of the community property regime, is entitled
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the benefit of separate property,"2 and when separate property has
been used for the benefit of community property. 3 In these instances the property used is treated "as an interest free loan."'"
A literal reading of old article 2408, formerly the sole reimbursement provision, would indicate that the only time reimbursement

could be claimed was when an increase in the other spouse's separate property was due to the common labor, expenses, or industry. 5
An explanation for not allowing reimbursement when separate property was used to increase the value of the community may be that a
spouse was assumed to be willing to give to the community without

any expectation of reimbursement. The jurisprudence developed a
more realistic view which did not so limit the right to recompense."0

The new articles on reimbursement have been recognized as merely
an "attempt to legislate the jurisprudential application of article
2408.!'61

The incorporation of these articles into the Civil Code is commendable in that they generally clarify the various situations which
will entitle -a spouse to reimbursement. However, some attention
must be given to problems which may arise, as in the following
hypothetical situation.

H and W have been married for two years. Before the marriage
to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the
time it was used.
Reimbursement may only be made to the extent of community assets, unless
the community obligation was incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses
of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance, and education of children of
either spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the community. In the
last case, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other even if there are
no community assets.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2366 provides:
If community property has been used for the acquisition, use, improvement, or
benefit of the separate property of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled upon termination of the community to one-half of the amount or value that the community
property had at the time it was used.
63.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 2367 provides:

If separate property of a spouse has been used for the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of community property, that spouse, upon termination of the
community, is entitled to one-half of the amount used or one-half of the value that
the property had at the time it was used, if there are community assets from
which reimbursement may be made.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2364, comment (d).
65. See note 56, supra.
66. See, e.g., Emerson v. Emerson, 322 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
67. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 141-42. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2366, comment (c). A noteworthy fact is that articles 2364-2368 all cite prior article 2408 in their
source provisions.
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W purchased a duplex, which is her separate property." The
duplex is rented out to tenants. Absent a .declaration by W reserving the fruits, the rent generated from the duplex during
the existence of the community becomes community property."
W hires a painter and pays him $500 out of community funds to
paint the duplex. Two years later, H and W obtain a separation
from bed and board.
The two issues presented are whether H is entitled to reimbursement upon termination and if so, the proper amount to be reimbursed.
H may claim that community property has been used to satisfy a
separate obligation and that he should therefore be reimbursed
$250, ie., one-half of the amount of community property used. 0
However, W can claim that the payment satisfied a community
obligation because it was incurred "for the common interest of the
spouses."' Her claim will be based on simple economics. The painting of the duplex will result in increased rent charged to the
tenants. Since the rent collected is community property,"2 the paint
job clearly benefits the community. W may argue that since community funds were used to satisfy a community obligation, H has no
basis upon which he can claim reimbursement.
The issue of whether H is to be reimbursed is settled by the fact
that the obligation to pay the painter is in part a community obligation and in part the separate obligation of W. Civil Code article 2363
contemplates this possibility by defining a separate obligation, in
part, as "an obligation incurred for the separate property of a
spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the community." 3 This
flexible provision, when combined with article 2364, apparently
would be responsive to a balancing process whereby H will be reimbursed for one-half the amount or value of the community property
used to the extent that the community was not benefitted. In the
68. Civil Code article 2341 provides, in part, that separate property includes "property acquired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime."
See note 11, supra.
69. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2339. See also Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981), a
case which demonstrates judicial flexibility in recognizing what is sufficient to constitute a declaration reserving earnings as separate property.
70. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2364, the text of which appears in note 60, supra.
71. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2360, the text of which appears in note 8, supra (emphasis added).
72. See note 69, supra and accompanying text.
73. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2363, the text of which appears in note 7, supra (emphasis added). See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 2363, comment (c), which reads: "Thus, an

obligation incurred for the separate property of a spouse may be in part a community
obligation and in part a separate obligation of the spouse who incurred it." See also
Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 142.
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given hypothetical, criteria to be considered in determining the extent to which tWe community was not benefitted would include an
assessment of the total increase in rentals which the paint job will
provide minus the amount received from increase in rent so attributable before termination. The balancing process will entail a
determination of what part of the obligation is a community obligation and what part is the separate obligation of W. The latter figure
will be the basis for reimbursement to H.
The amount of reimbursement due to H may differ if the payment for the paint job is considered a use of community property
for the "improvement or benefit" of W's separate property pursuant
to article 2366. Unlike the article defining separate obligations, article
2366 does not recognize a balancing process. Although the article
provides for reimbursement when community funds are used to
benefit separate property, it does not address the situation in which
this use of community funds also benefits the community. A strict
application of article 2366 would result in reimbursement for H for
one-half of the amount or value of community property used, despite
the benefit he received from the increased revenues which the
duplex provided after it was painted.
Apparently, treating the payment to the painter under article
2364 would result in a different amount of reimbursement for H
than if the payment were treated under article 2366. Nevertheless,
either treatment obviously is accurate. No rational basis for the
reimbursement disparity is evident. Surely the legislature did not
intend that a potentially significant difference in reimbursement be
based on the arbitrary decision of whether community funds were
used to benefit separate property or to satisfy a separate obligation.
This potential problem could be avoided by amending article 2366 in
a manner that would take into account the extent to which the community itself was benefitted by a use of community property. The
remaining amount by which the separate property of a spouse has
benefitted could serve as the basis for reimbursement to the other
spouse.
Articles 2364 through 2367 provide that a spouse is "entitled to
reimbursement upon termination of the community . .

The con-

struction of the articles seems to contemplate reimbursement at or
after termination of the community for action taken during the existence of the regime. 5 If, during the existence of the community, an
74.

See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2364-2367, the texts of which appear in notes 60-63,

supra.
75. Article 2368, the text of which appears in note 58, supra, does not mention
termination. As noted in notes 56-58, supra, and accompanying text, article 2368 is
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antenuptial debt of one spouse is paid out of corpmunity funds, the
other spouse clearly has a right to reimbursement upon
termination." This right to reimbursement may make the effects of
article 2345 less burdensome for the non-incurring spouse. Whereas
article 2364 provides for reimbursement at termination for actions
taken during the existence of the regime, no corresponding article
provides for reimbursement for actions taken after termination. For
example, an antenuptial creditor, after termination, executes against
property of the former community in the possession of the nondebtor spouse. If the legislative intent was also to reduce the financial burden for the non-incurring spouse despite the application of
article 2357, reimbursement should be applicable. If reimbursement
is possible in this situation, the legislation should provide so
specifically." Perhaps the inclusion of "upon termination" in the provisions was intended only to prevent spouses from trying to claim
reimbursement during the community existence, and was not meant
to prohibit reimbursement after termination when the action taken
was also after termination. If the articles are intended to limit reimbursement to compensate for pre-termination expenditures, a more
strained interpretation of articles providing general relief will be
necessary in order to compensate the7 non-incurring spouse who has
made a post-termination expenditure. 1
Partition
Other than the articles on reimbursement 9 and accounting," Act
709 has provided no basis upon which to deal with problems which
arise between the spouses upon termination, such as the right to
partition. Although comment (a) to Civil Code article 2336 states
that "the coownership of the community is subject to the rules
most similar to prior article 2408. That source article also did not mention termination.
See note 56, supra. However, article 2368, like the other reimbursement articles, is

found in the section entitled "Termination of the Community." Therefore, other than
the difference in reimbursement formula, see note 58, supra, and accompanying text,
article 2368 should be treated in the same manner as the other reimbursement provisions.
76. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2364.
77. To the extent that the comments are helpful, they would seem to militate
against a change. Comment (b) to article 2345 mentions reimbursement, while the comment to article 2357 does not. Of course, the entire question becomes moot if the incurring spouse is insolvent, as will often be the case. The creditor has probably sought
recovery from the non-incurring spouse because the incurring spouse was not able to

pay the debt. In such a situation the right of reimbursement is of little value.
78.

LA. Civ. CODE arts. 21, 2364-2368; LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2091-2107. See also

Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 126-27.
79.
80.

LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2358, 2364-2368.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2369.
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governing termination of the regime rather than the general rules of
the Civil Code governing judicial partition," these specific rules do
not provide any procedure, upon termination, for dividing property
between the spouses.
Because of the manner in which partitions have been accomplished
in the past,8' the issue of how and when unsecured creditors are to
be paid is closely linked to the question of how property is to be
divided between the spouses. Despite the comment, "the rules
governing termination of the regime" do not provide answers to
questions focusing on these two aspects of partition.
Once the community is terminated, the spouses' status as
coowners' 2 gives either of them the right to seek a partition of the
community property." Civil Code articles 128984 and 13081, make it
apparent that the general rules of partition can be applied to partition of the community, even though the articles appear under the
chapter entitled, "Of the Partition of Successions."8 The spouses
may agree on how the property should be divided, in which case
they may enter into a voluntary partition." If they cannot so agree,
either spouse may petition for a judicial partition.88 In the latter
case, the judge has discretion 8 as to the mode of partition-whether
in kind" or by licitation." This discretion is limited by statute" and
the jurisprudence, 3 both of which clearly state a preference for partition in kind.
81.
82.

See text at notes 94-100, infra.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 & comments.

83. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 137-38; Comment, Judicial Dissolution
of the Marital Community in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REv. 167, 168-69 (1974).
84. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1289 provides: "No one can be compelled to hold property
with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action of partition."

85.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 1308 provides: "The action of partition will not only lie be-

tween co-heirs and co-legatees, but between all persons who hold property in common,

from whatever cause they may hold in common."
86. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1289-1414. While a conflict appears to exist between this
statement and comment (a) to article 2336, the comment probably refers specifically to
payment of creditors and reimbursement rights rather than to actual methods of partition.
87. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1294 & 1322. Voluntary partition is now possible among

spouses during the existence of the community. See note 31, supra.
88. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1294 & 1323.
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1336; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4605.
90.
91.
92.
93.
Ballard,

LA. Civ. CODE art. 1337.
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1339-1340.
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4606.
See, e.g.. Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806, 112 So. 2d 620 (1959); Ballard v.
367 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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Partitionand Rights of Creditors
In the past-despite the absence of a statutory foundation-the
community was treated as having a fictitious existence after termination for the purpose of paying community debts,' and creditors
of community obligations were given a preference over creditors of
separate obligations in satisfying their debts from community property." Due to jurisprudential development, the spouses' ownership
of community property at dissolution was deemed to be subject to
payment of community creditors." The spouses' interests were
merely contingent, as the amount of community debts had to be
determined before the residuum could be divided between the
spouses or their heirs.
Consistent with the fictitious community concept was the rule
prohibiting piecemeal partitions of the community. Efforts by one
spouse, upon termination, to recover a money judgment from the
other spouse for his "share" of a particular community asset" or his
"share" of all the property belonging to the former community"
before payment of debts were typically unsuccessful." The courts'
rejection of such attempts was based on the simple notion that
nothing was owed the complaining spouse "unless the liquidation of
the community [showed] some net amount remaining after the disposal of the property and payment of the debts."'0 0
The primary purposes served by the fictitious community were
protection of creditors and preference of community creditors over
separate creditors as to community assets. The new legislation, by
general philosophy and specific provision, makes the fictitious community an inappropriate concept. The community is "not a legal entity
1 1 It
but a patrimonial mass.""
is a peculiar type of coownership; thus
describing it as an entity which somehow "continues" after termination is theoretically improper. In addition, the need for the fictitious
community in order to protect creditors is diminished by the fact
that the new legislation is itself so creditor-oriented.' 2 Finally, since
article 2357 does not distinguish separate creditors from community
94. See generally Comment, supra note 29.

95. See, e.g., Thompson v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903); Landreneau v.
Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App..3d Cir. 1963).
96.
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894).
Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89 So. 2d 41 (1956).
Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932).
"We have been unable to find any case in the jurisprudence of this court,

where a piecemeal partition was obtained." Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. at 481, 89 So. 2d
at 44.
100. 230 La. at 480-81, 89 So. 2d at 44.
101.
102.

LA. CiV. CODE art. 2336, comment (c).
See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
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creditors at dissolution,' 8 no justification exists for the use of a doctrine to make that distinction.
Even though the fictitious community concept is not appropriate, problems still exist concerning payment of creditors upon
termination. The rights of unsecured creditors "remain the most difficult issue in the application of the articles on judicial partition to
termination of the community regime."'' If the spouses enter into a
voluntary partition, little difficulty for the creditors is foreseeable.
The precise purpose of article 2357 is toprovide relief for creditors,
particularly after a voluntary partition.'00 Even if one spouse's unequal bargaining power causes him to end 'up with few effects of the
former community, his creditors are not thereby prejudiced. They
may still execute against the property of the former community, irrespective of which spouse possesses the particular effects.
However, as has been pointed out elsewhere,'" creditors may have
problems if one spouse has executed a written assumption of responsibiltity.' 7 If one spouse, in conjunction with the voluntary partition,
makes an express assumption in exchange for a greater amount (or
all) of the community assets, the creditors of the non-assuming
spouse are clearly prejudiced. If their debtor is insolvent, they are
no longer protected by the general rule allowing them to execute
against that property of the former community which is now in the
hands of the other spouse. The assuming spouse will have to pay off
only one-half of the community obligations which the other spouse
incurred, thus leaving the other half unsatisfied. Commentators
have suggested that the revocatory action' 8 could be asserted
against the voluntary partition by the non-assuming spouse's creditors, as it would be their "sole remedy."'" Since fraudulent intent
must be shown in order to obtain revocation of the disputed contract, 0 the plaintiff's burden of proof in such an action is great.
103. See text at notes 8-12, supra, and at note 33, supra.
104. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 139-40.
105. The general approach of article 2357 apparently contemplates a voluntary partition wherein each spouse will have in his possession some "property of the former
community."

See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1. at 137.
The third paragraph of article 2357 provides:
A spouse may by written act assume responsibility for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse. In such case, the assuming spouse
may dispose of community property without incurring further responsibility for

106.
107.

the obligations incurred by the other spouse.
108. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1968-1994.
109. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 137. See also id. at 132-33.
110.

See generally Tate, The Revocatory Action in Louisiana Law, in ESSAYS ON

THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS-(1969), reprinted in S. LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGA.
TIONS IN THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE 483-86 (1979).
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Other than the potential problem posed by the express assumption, the voluntary partition is adapted easily to the provisions for
payment of creditors upon termination. However, the same cannot
be said of the judicial partition. If the judicial partition is "in kind,"
each spouse will receive particular community effects,' ' and article
2357 can still serve as the guideline for payment of creditors.'
However, if the partition is by licitation, the effects of the community
are sold, leaving cash to be divided between the spouses." ' "[PIroperty
of the former community" arguably is no longer in the possession of
the spouses for a creditor to recover from pursuant to the codal provision." 3 If the first paragraph of article 2357" is to apply to cash,
the problem of tracing the assets arises. That is, the creditor will
have to identify the money received from the sale. The creditor will
then have to follow a subsequent disposition of that money to determine if that disposition is for a purpose other than for the satisfaction of a community obligation. Such a disposition, of course, would
trigger the liability of the second paragraph of article 2357." 5 The
disposing spouse may in fact be relying on the finality of the partition judgment as precluding the application of the second paragraph.
Nevertheless, where creditors have not yet been satisfied, article
2357 should still be applicable. Tracing could become extremely complicated, with the result that creditors-contrary to the general
policy of the Code revisions-would suffer from termination and
subsequent partition of the community.
An alternative interpretation which article 2357 offers is even
less attractive. Applying the second paragraph of the provision " '
would cause the spouses to incur personal liability for "all obligations incurred by the other spouse," up to the value of the community
property sold at judicial sale. The second paragraph probably contemplates a voluntary disposition by the non-incurring spouse which
then triggers the personal liability. Therefore, the provision should
not be read with a judicial sale in mind." Nevertheless, the legisla111.
112.

LA. CiV. CODE art. 1337.
LA. CiV. CODE art. 1339.
113. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2357.
114. The first paragraph of article 2357 provides: "An obligation incurred by a
spouse before or during the community property regime, may be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of the former community and from the
separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
115. The second paragraph of article 2357 provides: "If a spouse disposes of property
of the former community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community
obligations, he is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up the value of
that community property."
116. See note 115, supra.
117. See note 105. supra
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tion does not limit specifically the effect of article 2357. Therefore,
the possibility of the provisions's second paragraph being applicable
should be considered.
If the judicial sale to effect the partition is treated as a "disposition" in the sense of article 2357, the spouses may be reluctant to
seek a judicial partition. If H has incurred $5,000 worth of separate
debts, and W has incurred none, H has nothing to lose by having the
partition by licitation treated as a "disposition." However, W would
risk incurring personal responsibility-depending on the value of
the community property she disposes of-for payment of H's
separate obligations. Since she otherwise would not have had to pay
those debts, the judicial partition clearly would be injurious.
Such a result may be a desirable one in that it may serve to encourage voluntary partitions. Of course, it may also serve to
discourage agreement by H in the hypo above to a voluntary partition, since a judicial partition may result in W's personal liability.
However, "encouragement" or "disincentive" to the extent that it
will create a fear of judicial partition does not seem to be a very appealing policy. Paradoxically, a spouse then could not afford to
dispose of community property without a judicial partition nor with
one, since both alternatives possibly would lead to increased personal liability. One effect of such a policy might be acquiescence in
an inequitable voluntary partition by a spouse who holds an inferior
bargaining position. Of course, even the voluntary partition would
not remedy the situation unless it is accompanied by an express
assumption," 8 since without the express assumption, disposition of
property of the former community can result in the additional liability.
Whereas entering into the express assumption involves responsibility
for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other
spouse, the express assumption-in theory a way to limit liability of
the assuming spouse-might involve more of a sacrifice than the
spouse can afford. Though it would serve to protect creditors, treatment of the judicial sale as a disposition under article 2357 clearly
would result in endless liability for the spouses. The result would be
particularly unfair in the case of a spouse who has not incurred any
separate obligations and who, in addition, holds a bargaining position which is inferior to the other spouse.
One suggestion for the orderly payment of unsecured creditors
upon termination of the community was part of a proposal which
was rejected by the legislature. The concept of administration of the
118. See note 46, 8upra, and accompanying text.
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community was enacted in 1978,"' only to be repealed in 1 9 7 9 .'" As
part of the administration scheme, the legislation provided that
secured creditors, and then unsecured creditors, would be paid
before each spouse was given one-half of the remaining community
assets.2 ' This procedure seems to be the most desirable method of
assuring that creditors are not injured by termination of the community. As Professor Bilbe observed, the procedures under the administration scheme would affect the spouses' responsibilities "only
as they cause funds to be applied to obligations."' 2 2 Thus, the right
of a spouse's creditor to execute against that spouse's separate property would not be adversely affected.' 3
The payment scheme under the administration concept would involve payment of secured creditors "with priority from the proceeds
of the secured property," with any balance due "paid to them as
unsecured creditors."' 2' If, after payment to the secured creditors,
the remaining community assets were not sufficient to pay all the
debts, each unsecured creditor-community or separate-was to be
paid "in the proportion that his claim bears to the total obligations
of both spouses."'25 The lack of a distinction between community and
separate debts is "clearly well based,""' since no such distinction is
made during the existence of the regime with regard to satisfaction
of debts from community assets."7 After this ratable distribution the
administration would be at an end, since there would no longer be a
patrimonial mass to administer. If debts have not been satisfied in
full, creditors still could recover from the separate property of their
debtor."' Presumably, the ability to recover from the debtor's
separate property would also apply to creditors who had received
nothing from the ratable distribution as a result of their lack of
knowledge of the proceedings. Perhaps the administration concept
119. LA. R.S. 9:2851 (Supp. 1978) repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5, provided,
in part, that "upon dissolution of the community regime, or pending a suit that may
result in its dissolution, either spouse may petition for an administration of the community property in the manner provided in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure."
120. For an informative accounting of the fate of the administrator/special commissioner concept in the legislature, see Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 133-36.
121. See LA. R.S. 9:2852 (Supp. 1978), repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5.
122. Bilbe, supra note 31, at 432.
123. Id.
124. LA. R.S. 9:2852(B) (Supp. 1978), repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5.
125. LA. R.S. 9:2852(C) (Supp. 1978), repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5.

126. Bilbe, supra note 31, at 433.
127. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2345.
128. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2357. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2817 & comments thereto (a
partnership is "primarily liable" for partnership debts, but individual partners are
"secondarily liable").
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was rejected for other reasons,'" in which case the legislature would
not be opposed to adopting the payment procedure which was part
of the larger administration scheme.
Partitionand the Spouses
The method by which the partition is accomplished also raises
questions as to the position of the spouses. In a voluntary partition,
the risk of a spouse in a weak bargaining position being. forced to
settle for a less-than-ideal agreement always exists. By the use of a
judicial partition "in kind," however, the spouses would be able to
avoid unequal distribution of the community effects. The legislature
recently has enacted a new Civil Code article which will help to insure that courts will partition community property fairly.
Article 2369.1 now provides:
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of the
community, either spouse may obtain a judgment decreeing a
partition of the community in kind by allocation of assets and
liabilities of equal net value to each spouse. Ifthe community or
any part thereof cannot be conveniently divided, the court shall
order partition by licitation.' °
Prior to the adoption of article 2369.1, Louisiana had used the
"item theory" to partition the community, as opposed to the "aggregate theory."' 8 Both approaches can be identified with the partition "in kind"-as opposed to "by licitiaton"-since under either
theory each spouse receives "his share of the movables and immovables."' 32 The difference in the two theories lies in the manner in
which each spouse receives his share. The "item theory" requires
that each particular community effect be divided between the
spouses. Some items obviously are not susceptible to this method.
The Civil Code provisions governing partition state that property indivisible by nature or property which cannot be divided conveniently
must be "sold at public auction," i.e., partitioned by licitation. 33
Therefore, under the "item theory," the partition of many items was
required to be effected by judicial sale.
The use of the phrase "equal net value"'3 ' in the new article in129.
130.

See text at notes 169-73, infra.
1981 La. Acts, No. 751, § 1. adding LA. Civ. CODE art. 2369.1.

131.

See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

444-45 (1975).
132. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1337.
133. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1339.
134. (Emphasis added).
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dicates that Louisiana is now adopting the more flexible "aggregate
theory." Under this approach, different assets of equal value'35 are
allotted to each spouse. The crucial language in the article is "net
value," since it suggests that several items may be given to one
spouse and several other items given to the other spouse as long as
the total, or net, value of the items given each spouse is equal. Certain items which are by their nature indivisible will no longer have
to be sold automatically. Rather, one spouse may take possession of
such items in exchange for assets of equal net value given to the
other spouse.
Despite the wide discretion given to its courts136 in directing a
partition, Louisiana has been alone among the community property
states in never using the aggregate theory.3 7 Prior refusal to adopt
the theory inevitably had brought about some unfair results. A simple example, similar to the facts of Ballard v. Ballard,"8 involves a
couple who owns 70 percent of the shares of a closely held corporation. The other 30 percent are owned by H's close business associate
of many years. If, in a judicial partition, the item theory is used to
divide the property "in kind," H and W would each receive 35 percent of the corporate shares. This "equal" division is far from equal
in fact. H and his close associate will be able to maintain full control
of the corporation, while W now has a greatly diminished interest in
a business from which she probably will want to disassociate
herself."9 If W decides to sell, little if any competition will surface
which could drive up the price, since a minority interest in a close
corporation has virtually no marketability. H and his associate
would very likely purchase the shares at a price well below their actual value. The end result for W is that she receives much less in
the partition than the actual value of her interest in the business.
135. Some states allow for "equitable division" of assets, whereby "Iflactors such as
which spouse has the greater need and which spouse earned or acquired the community
assets are to be considered." W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 131, at 464-65. See,
e.g., Aaiz. REv. STAT. § 25-318A (Supp. 1977 & 1980); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
26.08.110 (repealed). Civil Code article 2369.1 apparently rejects such an approach, using the phrase "equal net value" (emphasis added).
136.

LA. CiV. CODE art. 1336; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4605.

137. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 131, at 464. The other community property states are Arizona. California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington. See, e.g., Butler v. Butler, 228 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969). See
also Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TuL. L. REV. 555, 581 (1975);

Comment, supra note 83, at 185-86
138. 367 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
139. The partition in this situation easily could work unfairly as to both H and W.
If H had been the moving force and manager of the corporation, his diminished interest could result in diminished control.
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Under the aggregate theory, a clearly better result is reached. A
proponent for the aggregate theory urges that "the party who effectively controls the corporation should be permitted to keep the
stock intact and the other spouse required to accept other property
of equal value. Problems like this can only be resolved by the courts'
full utilization of their discretion over the mode of partition." 4 '
Though falling short of adopting the aggregate approach, Louisiana courts have shown some use of judicial discretion in effecting
partitions. The recent case of Tri-State Concrete Co., Inc. v.
Stephens" involved co-owners of two tracts of land which the court
ruled could not be divided in kind."' The defendant in the partition
suit was in an inferior bargaining position, and the court recognized
that the plaintiff would be able to purchase the property at public
auction for a price below actual value. In order to protect the defendant, the court set a minimum price which the property had to bring
at public sale."4 3 In so doing, the court spoke in terms that are equally
applicable to spouses who seek a judicial partition:
One of the primary objectives of ordering the property sold
at public sale . . . is to allow each of the owners to realize the
full present value of the property ....
If the property were sold
at public sale for substantially less than the appraised value ...

the purpose of realizing full present value for each of the owners
would be entirely frustrated.""
The setting of a minimum price for purchase at judicial sale serves
to protect a spouse with inferior purchasing power, particularly in
cases where no third persons will be bidding on the item. However,
the new Code article will help to assure fair division of the community
without the necessity of selling the effects.
Flexibility was aiso shown by a court effecting a partition in
Ballard v. Ballard."5 In that case, despite defendant's request, the
court failed to set a minimum bid. Nevertheless, it did consider unequal bargaining positions in ordering a partition in kind rather than
by licitation,' even though that decision served to diminish the
140.

Comment, supra note 83, at 186.

141. 395 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
142. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1339-1340. It should be kept in mind that co-owners
like the ones in this case differ from spouses in that these co-owners have only a few
assets to divide rather than the many community effects which accumulate between

spouses over the years.
143. 395 So. 2d at 898.
144. Id at 897.
145. 367 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
146. See also National Am. Bank of New Orleans v. Cleveland, 273 So. 2d 848 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973), wnit denied, 276 So. 2d 701 (La. 1973).
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value of the item. The court's decision was contrary to the general
rule directing partition by licitation whenever a partition in kind
will result in diminution in value or inconvenience." 7 Because of the
unequal bargaining positions, the court departed from the norm. The
solution under new article 2369.1 will avoid diminishing the value of
the item while at the same time not requiring its judicial sale.
Though the court's flexibility in Ballard is commendable, article
2369.1 will permit an even more equitable decision.
Dhuet v. Taylor' helps to define the parameters of judicial
discretion in effecting partitions. In that case, the court reversed a
trial judge's decision that had adjudicated the community property
to one spouse upon payment of a sum of money to the other spouse.
By declaring that "partition, either in kind or by licitation ...

is the

proper procedure for terminating coownership interests in
property,"'4 9 the appellate court imposed a procedural limit on judicial
discretion in dividing property among spouses at termination. 5 '
Louisiana has used a means somewhat analgous to the aggregate
theory to partitionproperty. The Civil Code provides for the property
to be divided into "lots," which are then allocated among the parties
by means of a drawing. 5' The formation of the lots always has been
considered a way of effecting a partition in kind.'52 However, the
allocation has been done in random fashion, the belief being that "it
is not within the province of the experts to suggest that a certain
part or parts of the property be set apart or allocated to one of the
3
co-owners."'15

The new Code article does not provide for how assets are to be
allocated between the spouses; it merely provides that such allocation be "of equal net value." The random manner used for distributing "lots" is particularly inappropriate for the division of community
assets among spouses. All the cases found using the lot method in-

147. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1339-1340.
148. 383 So. 2d 1061 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
149. Id. at 1062.
150. Arguably, the Dhuet court also placed a limit on the method of dividing property among the spouses by refusing to allow judicial allocation of all the property to
one spouse upon payment of a sum of money to the other. However, because the appellate court recognized the procedure-failure to file suit for partition-as inappropriate, little attention was given to the method which the trial court had authorized.

151. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1364-1367.
152. See, e.g., Aucoin v. Greewood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942).
153. Raceland Bank & Trust Co. v. Toups, 173 La. 742, 750, 138 So. 652, 655 (1931).
See also Wyche v. Taylor, 191 La. 891, 186 So. 602 (1939); Taylor v. Bell, 155 So. 2d 68
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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volve heirs'" or other co-owners 55 who are not spouses. At previously noted,' spouses and other co-owners are significantly different in
the number and nature of assets which the former hold in a com-

munity. A random drawing would be impractical where, for example,
the spouse who effectively runs the family business is divested of it
in exchange for the house which the other spouse actually prefers.
The allocation of assets under article 2369.1 should be handled in a
subjective manner that allows practical as well as equal division. '
One aspect of the "lot" approach, however, would be helpful and
should be utilized in applying the aggregate theory. Civil Code article
1366 allows "a return of money" in order to compensate for lots
which are unavoidably unequal.15 Allowing a money adjustment in
the allocation of assets would be a tremendous aid for the court.'59
An allocation of all assets resulting in shares of exactly equal net
value for each spouse is difficult to imagine. The power to allow a
money adjustment would further the apparent policy of the article
and would avoid the necessity of having to resort to judicial sale of
many items.' Other community property states utilize a money adjustment for unequal-or inequitable -distribution."' Money adjustment has been a helpful tool in implementing the lot method in Louisiana ' 2 and should be used in proceedings under the new article.
A curious problem is posed by the new article in that it provides
154. See, e.g., Rayner v. Rayner, 171 La. 1050, 132 So. 784 (1931).
155. See, e.g., Aucoin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942).
156. See note 142, supra.
157. Although a degree of subjectivity is needed, the use of the term "equal" in the
new article suggests that Louisiana courts will not be permitted the same flexibility as
courts in the states that allow "equitable" division. See note 135, supra. See, e.g., Nace
v. Nace, 104 Ariz. 20, 448 P.2d 76 (1968), in which the Arizona Supreme Court recognized
that "the trial court is not required to divide the property evenly, only equitably." 104
Ariz. at 23, 448 P.2d at 79 (emphasis added).
158. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1366 provides: "When the lots are of unequal value, such inequality is compensated by means of a return of money, which the coheir, having a lot
of more value than the other, pays to his coheirs."
159. If the Dhuet opinion can be treated as a limitation on the method by which
property may be divided between the spouses, see note 150, supra, this suggestion
might require a reversal of that court's position that one spouse cannot be given all
the property upon payment of a money sum to the other.
160. The last sentence of new article 2369.1 provides: "If the community or any
part thereof cannot be conveniently divided, the court shall order partition by licitation."
161. See, e.g., McCune v. McCune, 120 Ariz. 402, 586 P.2d 651 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978); Tammen v. Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
162. Aucoin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942); Rayner v. Rayner, 171
La. 1050, 132 So. 784 (1931); Maddox v. Percy, 351 So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977);
DeLee v. DeLee, 328 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

for partition in kind "by allocation of assets and liabilities of equal
net value."' 63 However, unless the creditor expressly novates the
debt"6 ' as to one of the spouses, he apparently will not be bound by
the allocation of liabilities. Even if the court directs H to pay
creditor A, nothing prevents A from satisfying the debt from the
property of the former community which has been allocated to W."'
Although W may think that the judicial allocation insulates her from
liability to A, the situation is in fact no different from one in which
H and W had entered into a voluntary partition. Article 2357 may in
fact contemplate a voluntary partition," but neither that provision
nor article 2369.1 indicates that article 2357 does not operate after a
judicial partition. In order for article 2369.1 to effectively allocate
liabilities, the legislature will have to provide that article 2357 is inapplicable whenever a court has directed allocation of liabilities. The
inclusion of "liabilities" in the article reflects a legislative intent to
provide truly equal division of the community by making certain
that each patrimony is affected similarly. Nevertheless, as the Civil
Code already gives creditors the right to execute against the property of the former community, judicial allocation of liabilities apparently will have no effect on them.
Administration of Community, Special Commissioner, or Special
Master
Despite some hope that the concept would be "resurrected at a
future legislative session," ' ? an amendment to the bill that enacted
article 2369.1 deleted provisions which would have permitted either
spouse to petition for the appointment of a special commissioner to
assist the court in the partition of the community.' A provision
already exists which gives the notary the power to effect the partition. ' Nevertheless, the rejection of the special commissioner is
another in a series of setbacks for the idea of providing for a neutral
third person with more powers than the notary to help the court
better assure the spouses of a just partition.' 0 Implementing certain
aspects of the administration or special commissioner concept would
be of some assistance to the court, as well as a protective device for
the spouses. In order to avoid confusion with pre-conceived notions
163.
164.
165.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 2369.1 (emphasis added), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 751, § 1.

166.
167.
168.

See note 105, supra, and accompanying text.
Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 136.
La. H.B. No. 1625 (engrossed version), 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).

169.
170.

LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4605.
See note 120, supra.

LA. Cxv. CODE arts. 2185-2198.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357.
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of what duties an "administrator" or "special commissioner" or

"special master" actually performs, suggestions which follow will
focus on the actual functions involved rather than on possible labels
or titles for the respective offices. Discussion of prior legislative proposals, of course, will require the use of terminology involved
therein.
The provision in Act 627 of 1978 authorizing an administration
of the community was not to become effective until procedural rules
governing it were adopted."' Pursuant to a House Concurrent
Resolution directing the Louisiana Law Institute to make recommendations "necessary to achieve the policy objectives" of the
revisions,' procedural articles implementing the administration concept were proposed.'T s The administrator's powers were "somewhat
when compared with those of the notary. 7 ' The adradical"''
ministrator was to have "the duty of collecting, preserving, and
17
managing the property of the community in accordance with law.' '
When it became clear that this concept would fail to gain legislative
approval, the less "radical" idea of special commissioner was
substituted. 17 Like the proposed administrator, he was assigned the
task of "effect[ing] a division of the community between the spouses
as soon as is advisable."'7 8 Unlike the administrator, however, the
special commissioner's power was limited to "locating, identifying,
listing, and valuing all assets and liabilities of the former
community."'7 " He was to prepare a tableau listing community prop8
erty and obligations and to propose a division of the community. "
The duties of the special commissioner were thus very similar to
those of the notary.''
From a conceptual viewpoint, the rejection of the administration
concept is understandable. As the administrator was given power to
manage the property of the community, his task was analagous to
171.

1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.

172. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
La. H.B. No. 801 (engrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
Spaht & Samuel, supra note 1, at 136.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1347-1381.
La. H.B. No. 801 (engrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (proposed LA. CODE
art. 4762).
La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
La. H.B. No. 801 (engrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (proposed LA. CODE
art. 4762); La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (proposCODE Civ. P. art. 4757).
La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (proposed LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 4757).
180. I& (proposed LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4760).
181. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1347-1381.
173.
174.
175.
176.
Civ. P.
177.
178.
Civ. P.
ed LA.
179.
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that of a liquidator or a receiver. 8 ' By allowing the community to be
managed by an administrator, the proposal treated the community
as an "entity" similar to a corporation. In this light, the idea of administration seems to be inconsistent with the clear legislative
desire not to have the community considered a separate entity.'83
The payment of creditors scheme, which was part of the larger
administration concept, has been suggested as an orderly method by
which to pay unsecured creditors upon termination. 8 ' However, the
reason that scheme would not put an end to a creditor's right to
recover from his debtor after ratable distribution is due to the differences between the community and a separate entity such as a
corporation. The procedure for liquidation of a corporation provides
that a creditor who fails to present his claim after notice of the proceedings may be "perpetually and peremptorily barred" from recovery." 5 That result is in harmony with the notion that the corporation has come to an end and an entity no longer exists from which to
recover. A similar problem for creditors of a spouse does not arise
upon termination of the community. Satisfaction of debts comes
from the spouses. The community's dissolution clearly does not terminate a creditor's right to have the debt satisfied.' A theoretical
inconsistency exists in providing for an administration of the community when that community is not to be recognized as a separate
entity.
From a practical viewpoint, however, complex cases may arise in
which the court needs to appoint a person to manage and conserve
certain assets of the community. For example, a third person given
the power to manage and conserve an ongoing business could protect the interests of the spouses in a manner less destructive than
an injunction issued to prevent its continued operation. 8 Although
the person appointed would not solve the issue of payment of
debts,' " his presence in certain exceptional cases would be justified
as a great aid to the court as well as a protection for the spouses. 88
182.
183.
184.
185.

See, e.g., LA. R.S. 12:141-149 (1950); 75 C.J.S. Receivers §§ 1-431 (1952).
See note 101, supra, and accompanying text.
See text at notes 119-29, supra.
LA. R.S. 12:147(c) (Supp. 1968).

186.

LA. CiV. CODE art. 2357.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 149; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3944. See also Spaht & Samuel,

187.

supra note 1, at 134.
188. See text at notes 119-29, supra.
189. The court may possess inherent power to protect property by appointing a
person to act as a manager or conservator. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 191. The court
may also be able to authorize a fact finder in complex cases. See text at notes 177-79,
supra. See note 191, infra.
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In addition to a person who would manage and conserve particular community assets, the court may need to appoint a special
fact-finder in some complicated cases. The appointment of this person-like the appointment of the person who will manage and conserve-should be "the exception and not the rule."'" A special factfinder would be needed only in complex disputed fact situations. The
person would make findings regarding, for example, whether a certain item is separate or community property. The power to make initial findings of fact would allow this person to do more than the
notary presently does."' The fact finder could present his findings to
the court, and the judge would use them in determining partition
and reimbursement rights.""
The very purpose for which officers of the court were suggested-in rare cases in which they would be needed-would be to
serve as objective forces concerned with the rights of both parties.
While valid reasons militate against the administrator or special
commissioner as proposed, the appointment of persons to perform
the suggested functions upon judicial decision as to its necessity
should be given legislative attention.
Conclusion
Some of the changes which have been recommended simply
would clarify the intent of the legislature at the time of the drafting
of the revisions. As more complicated fact situations appear before
the courts, the need for more clarity will become manifest. Other
suggestions concern questions which the law has thus far neglected.
The fact that a study will be made by a joint committee of the
legislature' is a positive indication that the lawmakers seek to fur190. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) (reference of an issue to a "master" should be done
only in exceptional cases).
191. See Randazzo v. Randazzo, 401 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), which emphasizes that the notary's function is "expected to be purely ministerial." Id. at 1256.
That case involved rather unusual conduct in the trial court, wherein the notary heard
witnesses in the presence of the judge and then made his recommendations. Although
the appellate court questioned the "irregularity of the proceedings," no reversible error
was found, and the lower court's homologation of the notary's findings was affirmed. Id.
The Randazzo case is of interest in that it states limits to the notary's power which
should not be exceeded. However, the suggested provision for a fact-finder could be accomplished by expanding the notary's power so as to allow him to hear witnesses and
make initial findings of fact. The manner in which the suggested fact-finder is incorporated into the legislation should be given careful attention, as it is important to
delineate clearly the powers that such an official would possess. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
P. 53. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 191 may authorize the court to appoint
such a fact finder, though no guidance is provided.
192. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e).
193. See note 6, 8upra, and accompanying text.
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ther improve the matrimonial regimes law, particularly as it
governs termination of the community. Consideration hopefully will
be given to some of these suggestions as those improvements are
made.
C. Lawrence Orlansky

